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THE CONTROL OF OPERATIONS OF
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS
By Guy G. DEFURIA*
GENERAL BACKGROUND
F EDERAL savings and loan associations, the federal counter-part of thelocal and state-supervised building and loan associations, were created
under the provisions of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933.' The local
building and loan associations were buffeted severely by the winds of the de-
pression, and this system of mutual liability thrift associations, to encourage
savings and to help members in buying homes, was jeopardized. Congress
decided to establish a parallel system of Federally incorporated associations,
with the very important additional mainstay of insurance of accounts, which
security to members or depositors was not provided in the State building and
loan systems. The amount of insurance originally was $5,000, and is now
$10,000, generally for each account. All accounts in Federal associations are
required to be insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpora-
tion, and instrumentality of the United States, ' operated by Federal Home
Loan Bank Board.
This same Federal Home Loan Bank Board is an independent agency
in the executive branch of the Government of the United States, and is
charged with the duties and responsibilities for the "organization, incorpora-
tion, examination, operation and regulation" of Federal savings and loan as-
sociations.' The Board is composed of three members, appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate. It now governs a vast and important
section of our financial activities, since it controls more than 27 billion dollars
of assets which are held by almost 1,800 Federal savings and loan associa-
tions with about 12 million shareholders.' In addition, local building and
loan associations may now qualify for insurance of accounts while remaining
State associations. To the extent of the insurance of accounts, these state
associations are under the control and supervision of the Federal Home Loan
* A.B., LL.B., University of Pennsylvania. Member, Delaware County, Pennsylvania and
American Bar Associations.
148 STAT. 132 (1933), 12 u.s.c. § 1464 (1946). See generally, Heisler, "Federal-State Associa-
tions: Their Status", National Sav. and Loan Journal, May 1958, p. 10.
248 STAT. 1256, 1257 (1934), 12 U.S.c. § 1725, § 1726a (1946).
369 STAT. 640 (1955), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1437b (1957).
448 STAT. 132 (1933), 12 u.s.c. § 1464a (1946).
5 See Pleadings, Sept. 1958, Greater Del. Valley Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n. v. Federal Home
Loan Bank Bd., No. 12664 (3d Cir. 1958).
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Bank Board. It is said that the insured accounts in both Federal and State
associations now number more than 21 million and involve more than 50
billion dollars.'
Generally, qualified State associations may now convert to Federal as-
sociations, and vice-versa, on a reciprocal basis. A great many State associa-
tions have converted into Federal associations. A few Federal associations,
principally in California and for unusual reasons, have converted into State
associations. There is some competition between the two systems, and one
of the important considerations for building and loan association managers,
in resolving the question of Federal or State charter, is the kind of super-
vision and control exercised by the appropriate regulatory agency. The Presi-
dent of the United States Savings and Loan League " said recently:
"How fortunate we are in the savings and loan business that there is little
Federal-State controversy. . . . The dual system of charters [affords] an
incentive for progress. Competition between chartering authorities is one of the
means of progress. Federal associations are granted some new power by Con-
gress, and State associations are thus able to persuade State authorities to give
them the same or even broader powers. . . . The dual system of charters also
provides a type of escape valve against dictatorial, arbitrary or unwise super-
vision. One of the reasons associations in some States have converted to
Federal charters was because the State supervisors were not at all helpful and
at times almost completely reflected commercial banker antagonism toward our
business. On the other hand, I know there have been a few Federal associa-
tions that converted to State institutions because the State law was better and
the State supervisor had a better understanding of our business. The dual
system of charters provides some measure of protection against bad supervisory
practices and an antagonistic attitude toward the business.... -
THE POWER TO REGULATE
Congress has given the Federal Home Loan Bank Board authority to
make policy and rules and regulations for the operation, supervision and
regulation of the Federal associations, "giving primary consideration to the
best practices of local mutual thrift and home-financing institutions in the
United States." ' Every Federal savings and loan association is a mutual,
quasi-public, corporate instrumentality of the United States operated, not for
the profit of its officers, but "to provide local mutual thrift institutions in
6 See Proceedings, Pennsylvania Sav. and Loan League, June 15, 1958; Heisler, "Federal-State
Associations", supra note 1; Fortune Magazine, May 1958, p. 151.
7This is the larger of two voluntary "leagues" of both Federal and State associations, the
other being The National League of Insured Savings Associations.
8 Address of Mr. Joseph Holzka, Pa. Sav. and Loan League, June 15, 1958.
948 STAT. 132 (1933), 12 u.s.c. § 14 64a (1946); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947);
Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Mallonee, 196 F. 2d 336 (9th Cir. 1952).
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which people may invest their funds", and "to provide for the financing of
homes." 10 It is evident that a large measure of control and regulation in
such a system would be required for the protection of the public.
This power to control and regulate Federal savings and loan associations
has been granted to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board by two subsections
of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, as amended.1 By the provisions of
the first subsection, the Board is authorized to state by formal resolution:
.. . .any alleged violation of law or regulation and give written notice
to the association concerned of the facts alleged to be such violation.
Such association shall have thirty days within which to correct the alleged
violation of law or regulation and to perform any legal duty. If the associa-
tion concerned does not comply with -the law or regulation within such period,
then the Board shall give such association twenty days' written notice of the
charges against it and of a time and place at which the Board will conduct a
hearing as to such alleged violation of duty. . . . After such hearing and
adjudication by the Board, appeals shall lie as is provided by the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, and the review by the Court shall be upon the weight of
the evidence. Upon the giving of notice of alleged violation of law or regula-
tion as herein provided, either the Board or the association affected may, within
thirty days after the service of said notice, apply to the United States district
court for the district where the association is located for a declaratory judgment
and an injunction or other relief with respect to such controversy, and said court
shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate the same as in other cases and to enforce
its orders. The Board may apply to the . . . court . . . for the enforcement
of any order of the Board and such court shall have power to enforce any such
order which has become final .... "12
These provisions were adopted by Congress in 1954 by amendment to the Act
"to provide a means by administrative and court proceedings whereby the
Board may enforce compliance with law and regulations . . . in cases
where the Board felt that the appointment of a conservator or receiver was not
necessary or desirable." "
It is obvious that under this subsection, while power is given to the Board
to enforce compliance with law and regulation, there are broad safeguards
of notice, hearing, and court control and review. Until all these safeguards
are exhausted, the Board may not interfere with the operation of a Federal
1048 STAT. 132 (1933), 12 u.s.c. § 1464a (1946); Hopkins Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n. v.
Cleary, 296 U.S. 315, 343 (1935); Fed. Say. and Loan Ins. Corp. v. Kearney Trust Co., 151 F. 2d.
720 (8th Cir. 1945).
"I Section 5 (d) (1) and 5 (d) (2) of the Act, 48 STAT. 132 (1933), 12 u.s.c. 1464 (d)
(1) and (2) (1946).
1248 STAT. 132 (1933), 12 u.s.c. § 1464 (d) (1) (1946).
"3See note 12 U.s.c.A. § 1464 p. 37 (1257).
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association, unless the case falls within the "emergency" provisions of the Act,
which will be discussed next. The provisions of this first subsection might
be termed the "cease and desist" provisions.
The other relevant subsection, 4 which contains the "emergency" pro-
visions, as amended in 1954, now provides for the procedure for the appoint-
ment of a conservator or receiver for any association charged by the Board
with violation of law or regulation, and also provides that in an emergency
the Board may immediately and without notice appoint a Supervisory Repre-
sentative in Charge. This subsection provides:
"(2) The grounds for the appointment of a conservator or receiver for
a Federal savings and loan association shall be one or more of the following:
(i) insolvency . . . ; (ii) violation of law or of a regulation; (iii) the con-
cealment of its books, records, or assets . . . ; and (iv) unsafe or unsound
operation. The Board shall have exclusive jurisdiction to appoint a Supervisory
Representative in Charge, conservator, or receiver. If, in the opinion of the
Board, a ground for the appointment of a conservator or receiver as herein pro-
vided exists and the Board determines that an emergency exists requiring im-
mediate action, the Board is authorized to appoint ex parte and without notice
a Supervisory Representative in Charge to take charge of said association and its
affairs who shall have and exercise all the powers herein provided for con-
servators and receivers. Unless sooner removed by the Board, such Supervisory
Representative in Charge shall hold office until a conservator or receiver, ap-
pointed by the Board after notice as herein provided, takes charge of the as-
sociation and its affairs, or for six months, or until thirty days after the termina-
tion of the administrative hearing and final proceedings herein provided, or
until sixty days after the final termination of any litigation affecting such
temporary appointment, whichever is longest."
The appointment of a conservator or receiver may not be made "except
pursuant to a formal resolution of the Board stating the grounds therefor"
and until after an administrative hearing. "Such 'hearing shall be held in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act and shall
be subject to review as therein provided and the review by the court shall
be upon the weight of the evidence." It should be noted, however, that there
are no provisions in the Act for either prevention or review of the appoint-
ment by the Board of a Supervisory Representative in Charge. This "tem-
porary receiver" is entirely distinct from a conservator or receiver as provided
in the Act.
The appointment of a temporary receiver for a savings institution is a
drastic step, obviously fraught with danger both to the association and to the
Federal savings and loan system. While there are no provisions in the Act
1448 STAT. 132 (1933), 12 u.s.c. § 1464 (d) (2) (1946).
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requiring public notice of the appointment of the Supervisory Representative
in Charge, the appointment must, with the rapidity always attendant upon
news reflecting upon the position or conduct of a financial institution, become
known immediately. With the spread of this news, it is evident that the flow
of money into the association may cease, the flow out may increase even to
the extent of a "run"-making new mortgage commitments and investments
difficult or impossible. There may be an adverse effect upon the stability of
personnel. The Board must weigh carefully the ultimate objects sought to
be achieved against the many resulting harmful effects.
It is also evident that emergency powers must exist somewhere. In the
delicate field of banking, conditions may and do arise and change so quickly
that time is of the essence. As the Federal savings and loan system is now
constituted, the proper repository for such powers is the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board. However, legitimate questions arise: (1) whether the emer-
gency provisions in the Act are clear, and (2) whether the exercise of emer-
gency powers by the Board is fair and as contemplated by Congress.
THE EMERGENCY POWERS
The Act provides that the drastic method of control of a federal associa-
tion charged with violation of law or regulation may be exercised by the
Board if in the opinion of the Board a ground exists for the appointment of
a conservator or receiver, and if the Board determines that an emergency
exists. This, of course, is not the same as requiring that one of the grounds
exist and that an emergency exist. If the latter were the case, there would be
clear standing for judicial interference or review.
Among the grounds for the appointment of a conservator or receiver
are "violation of law or of a regulation" and "unsafe or unsound operation."
If the Board believes that one of these grounds exists, and if the Board de-
termines that an emergency exists, a Supervisory Representative in Charge
may be appointed, ex parte and without notice, to supersede the directors and
officers (and to a large extent the powers of the shareholders) of the associa-
tion.
There is no provision specifying how the Board shall determine whether
one of the grounds for the appointment of a conservator or receiver exists,
and no provision specifying how the Board shall determine that an emergency
exists. Of course, any requirement specifying on what basis or how these
determinations are to be made, of necessity, would derogate from the extent
and efficacy of the grant of the emergency power. However, these considera-
1959.]
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tions become important in the light of recent conduct of the Board in inter-
preting the "cease and desist" and the "emergency" powers granted to it by
the Act.
Ordinarily, one would suppose that the legislation is sufficiently clear
that in the ordinary case, where in fact no emergency exists, the Board should
control an association, which it charges with some violation, by means of the
"cease and desist" provisions of Section 5 (d) (1). On the other hand, it
would seem sufficiently clear that where in fact an emergency exists, the Board
should have the right to move quickly and drastically under Section 5 (d)
(2). However, a study of some recent cases leads to the conclusion that the
Board may believe it has the right to exercise its "emergency" powers even
when in fact no emergency exists, and that the Board is carrying this belief
into effect.
The particular point I am raising is not whether the position which seems
to have been taken by the Board is sound or unsound, as a principle of con-
trol in this delicate financial field, but whether that position is sound in the
light of the words of the Act, and whether this is what Congress intended.
Since the alternate procedure of "cease and desist" or "emergency" was
incorporated in the Home Owners Loan Act, by the 1954 Amendment, the
Board has apparently chosen to proceed under the "cease and desist" powers
on only one occasion."h It is natural that even in a non-emergency situation,
the Board should seek to avoid the somewhat cumbersome procedure specified
in Section 5 (d) (1). Before the 1954 Amendment, the only enforcement
machinery possessed by the Board was to appoint a conservator or receiver,
without a hearing, subject to the right of the association, within fourteen days,
to request a hearing to show cause why the conservator or receiver should not
be removed.
Does the Board have the right to use the "emergency" provisions in a
non-emergency situation, or is it relegated to the "cease and desist" procedure?
The statutory requirement that the Board must determine that an emergency
exists before a Supervisory Representative in Charge may be appointed would
seem to be devoid of real meaning if the Board is free to make such an ap-
pointment whenever it desires to do so, whether or not an emergency exists,
without fear of judicial restraint against arbitrary and capricious action.
The history of Section 5 of the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933 demon-
strates this conclusion. As originally adopted, Section 5 provided merely
15 Legal Bulletin, U.S. Say. and Loan League, July 1958, p. 162,
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that the Board could adopt regulations for the appointment of conservators
or receivers. This provision, which prescribed no standards whatever for
Board action thereunder, was the only enforcement machinery given to the
Board by the original Act.
The constitutionality of the original Act, in giving the Board unlimited
authority to appoint a conservator or receiver, unrestrained by statutory stand-
ards, was upheld in Fahey v. Mallonee."' In Mr. Justice Jackson's opinion in
that case, he stated that "it may be that explicit standards in the Home Owners'
Loan Act would have been a desirable assurance of responsible administra-
tion." 1 He characterized the practice of appointing a conservator before
a hearing had been held as "a drastic procedure" and "a heavy responsibility
to be exercised with disinterestedness and restraint." 18
Against this background, the Housing Act of 1954 " revised Section 5
(d). The Senate Committee report on this Act contains the following ex-
planation of the purpose of the revision:
"Under the broad statutory powers, the provisions for the appointment of
conservators and receivers of Federal savings and loan associations have always
been incorporated in the regulations of the Home Loan Bank Board for the
Federal savings and loan system. Title VI of the bill would enact statutory
provisions on this matter which would give the Board the authority needed to
protect the welfare of Federal associations and their members, and at the same
time provide orderly procedures for the exercise of the supervisory powers of
the Board.
The Board presently has no means, except through the appointment of a
conservator or receiver, to enforce the laws and regulations under which Federal
savings and loan associations operate. The bill would provide a method for the
enforcement of law and regulations without the necessity of the appointment
of a conservator or receiver, and would also establish standards and procedures
for the appointment of conservators and receivers. ' ' 20
During the hearings before the House Committee, Congressman Gordon
L. McDonough, the proponent of the amendment, in referring to the revision
of Section 5 (d), made the following statement:
. . . this will give the Federal savings and loan associations a great deal
more liberality than they have had under the existing law, and I think that, al-
though the original law was restrictive in the beginning, it perhaps had to be
16332 U.S. 245 (1947).
17 Id. at 250.
Is Id. at 253-4.
19 Sec. 503 (2), 68 STAT. 622, 634 (1954).
20 Sen. Rep. No. 1472, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 43 (1954). A similar statement appears in the
House Report, H. R. Rep. No. 1429, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 27 (1954).
1959.]
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because the Federal savings and loan associations of that time were somewhat
of an experiment. Now, we have millions of depositors, we have billions of
dollars on deposit, it is probably the most commonly used middle class and low-
income class group of deposit, next to postal savings, and the arbitrary, auto-
cratic authority that the Board had in the beginning should, in my opinion, be





That there was some concern that appointment of a Supervisory Representa-
tive in Charge be narrowly restricted is demonstrated by the following state-
ment by Congressman McDonough during the same hearings:
. . . The supervisor in charge, so-called, in this bill, is the exclusive
jurisdiction of the board only where immediate possession is necessary and
where there is evidence that immediate possession is necessary. That does not
apply to the conservator or receiver. The supervisor in charge is appointed
only when an extreme emergency exists." 22 (Emphasis added.)
As will be seen, the Board apparently takes the position that no one can
question in any case whether in fact an emergency exists, that the Board may
exercise its "emergency" powers in any case, that it need not use its "cease
and desist" powers unless it so desires, and that these matters are beyond re-
view or question by any court. Judicial decisions, almost uniformly, have
been in favor of the absolute powers of the Board. The savings and loan in-
dustry is concerned, and the United States Savings and Loan League has urged
that Section 5 (d) be amended to contain a protective provision along the
following lines: 2
"No supervisory representative in charge, conservator or receiver shall be
appointed, or private property seized, with respect to an association which is
solvent in that its assets are equal to or more than its obligations to its creditors,
including the members and others, if the alleged wrongdoing can be stopped
or otherwise corrected as is provided in this section or otherwise as provided by
law."
CHANGE OF POLICY TOWARD SELF-DEALING
Those who are familiar with these Federal associations from their in-
ception state that, at least in the early years, the Board encouraged the for-
mation of these associations by real estate and mortgage 'brokers and lawyers,
whose private businesses obviously would be related.24 Until recently, the
21 Hearing before House Committee on Banking and Currency on H.R. 7839, 83d Cong. 2d Sess.
206 (1954).
22 Id. at 204-205.
23 Legal Bulletin, U. S. Say. and Loan League, July 1958, p. 163; Study of Banking Laws,
Financial Institutions Act of 1957, Part 2, Senate Committee Qp Banking anj Currency, 1957, p. 608.
24 Russell, Say. and Loan Ass'n. (1956), p, 145,
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Board tolerated the management of Federal savings and loan associations by
persons conducting concurrently their own real estate, mortgage, insurance,
and conveyancing businesses, at least to the extent that the Board took no
definitive action to divorce over-lapping activities, or to prevent possible or
existing self-dealing.
Real estate, mortgage and insurance brokers, and conveyancers have
earned income from borrowers from Federal associations while acting as
directors, officers or employees of the association. This may or may not in-
volve divided loyalty, or violation of a position of trust, dependent on the
circumstances. The point I shall discuss is not the rightness of these prac-
tices, but whether the Board has the right to, or should, change its policy with
reference to these practices, without adopting pertinent regulations, and
whether it should implement its change of policy under the cover of exercise
by the Board of its "emergency", rather than its "cease and desist" powers.
It is evident from addresses and articles by members and officials of the
Board that there has been a radical change in policy. The Board now seems
to have decided to enforce against directors and officers to the Federal as-
sociations the highest standards of unilateral loyalty and trusteeship, and
to use all its enforcement machinery to this end.
In a recent article by John M. Wyman, Director of the Board's Division
of Supervision, the following appears: 25
"Probably nothing within the control of directors and officers is basically
more essential to real and abiding financial health and to the achievement and
preservation of merited esteem in the savings and loan business than the faith-
ful, full discharge by its directors and officers of their responsibilities as trustees
for other people's money.
Among the very real, down-to-earth fundamentals of the savings and
loan business in this definition-phrased in my own words-of the fiduciary
obligations of every director and every officer of every savings and loan associa-
tion:
FIRST: It is his duty to see to it that the operation of the association
is conducted in accordance with applicable statutes and regula-
tions, and in a safe and sound manner.
SECOND: It is his duty to avoid placing himself in a position, and to
avoid being placed in a position, where there is even an oppor-
tunity for considerations of personal benefit or advantage to
militate against independence of judgment or to color or in-
fluence action in the performance of his first duty.
25 "Duties and Responsibilities of Directors and Oficers", National Say. and Loan Journal,
August 1958, p. 8. For a strong reply to the "trusteeship" position, see Russell and Prather, "The
Association Director: Director or Trustee?', U. S. Say. and Loan League Legal Bulletin, Sept. 1958.
1959.]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
In this connection, it seems to be both fair and constructive to recognize,
and to say, that neither necessity nor prudence furnishes any occasion or warrant
for the institutions which comprise the savings and loan business to be regarded
or conducted by anybody as 'adjuncts' to some other business or activity.
Whether or not there may have been times or circumstances which in
some measure made tenable practices or relationships of a dependent nature
is now a question of historical interest only. Today's 50 billion dollar savings
and loan business is fully able to be independent, without invitation or resort
to personal 'sideline' benefits or activities."
Mr. Wyman contends that there is no need of defining what is and what is
not permitted, since the common law of trusteeship is clear. His article, it
seems to me, if it reflects the present policy of the members of the Bank Board,
does show that there has been a change of policy toward the whole matter
of self-dealing. The Board does have broad power to adopt regulations
covering this field. Of course, no regulation can cover every case, but a regu-
lation, having the force of law, can be drafted and adopted to make clear
what is the Board's new policy." It can be argued that this is the only fair
course.
In another article, which also appeared recently, it is said: 27
"The Federal Home Loan Bank Board, concerned about how much 'cor-
porate opportunity'-and possibly fraudulent opportunity-is being indulged
in by the Savings and Loans, in 1956 asked Congress for authority to regulate
the 'affiliate' activities of Savings and Loan directors. The industry raised such
a howl that the Senate failed to include the provision in the 1957 United States
Financial Institutions Bill."
The Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency
held hearings upon the proposed Financial Institutions Act of 1957. The
proposed Act was not adopted by Congress. In the proceedings before the
Subcommittee, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board asked that provisions be
inserted in the Bill "to give the Board express power to make rules and regu-
lations with respect to the relationships of and business transactions between
'insured associations' and individuals, corporations, and organizations that
are affiliated with such institutions." 28 The Board also asked that power be
given to it by specific legislation to remove or suspend "any director or officer
of a Federal home-loan bank member or an institution insured by the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, where such officer or director violated
20 See for instance, as to national banks, 12 u.s.c.A. § 78 (1957).
27 Fortune Magazine, May 1958, p. 213.
28 Hearings before Subcommittee of Senate Committee of Banking and Currency, Study of
Banking Laws, Part 2, Financial Institutions Act of 1957, Statement of Honorable Albert J. Robert-
son, Chairman, F.H.L.B.B., p. 960.
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any law or regulation relating to the institution, engaged in unsafe or un-
sound practices in conducting its business, or violated his duty to the institu-
tion as a director or officer." 29
An Advisory Committee, representing the savings and loan industry,
disapproved both these recommendations and they were not carried over into
the committee print. The objections were that the powers sought by the
Board were too ' eneral and indefinite, that the provisions would be unduly
stringent and severe, and would result in "too great a concentration of power
in the Board without adequate safeguards' 3" The Chairman of the Sub-
committee indicated that the entire bill could not be jeopardized by the in-
sistence of the Board upon "technical amendments" opposed by savings and
loan associations.31
THREE RECENT CASES
On March 20, 1956, the Board, being of the opinion that a ground existed
for the appointment of a conservator or receiver, and that an emergency
existed, appointed a Supervisory Representative in Charge of Beacon Fed-
eral Savings and Loan Association. 2 On July 11, 1956, the Board ordered
an administrative hearing to determine whether a conservator should be ap-
pointed for Beacon. On July 16, 1956, almost four months after the appoint-
ment of the Supervisory Representative in Charge, Beacon filed suit against
the Bank Board for declaratory and injunctive relief.83
The complaint filed by Beacon did aver that the appointment of a Super-
visory Representative in Charge was improper because there was no emergency.
However, the main contention of Beacon seems to have been that the Board
should have been required to proceed under Section 5 (d) (1), for correc-
tion of alleged improper practices, before resorting to the drastic procedure
under Section 5 (d) (2). Beacon contended that by failing to allow it a
fair opportunity to correct any violations of law or regulation, the Board had
been guilty of an abuse of discretion. The District Court held that it was
without jurisdiction since the Board had the discretionary right to use either
29 Id. at 961.
30 Id. at 961 and 967. Statement of Chairman Robertson, Feb. 15, 1957.
31 Id. at 963, Statement of Senator A. Willis Robertson, Subcommittee Chairman. See also,
Russell, "Two Theories of Supervision", U. S. Sav. and Loan League Legal Bulletin, Jan. 1957.
32 48 STAT. 132 (1933), 12 U.s.c. § 1464 (d) (2) (1946). I am informed that the first
notice of any criticism was at a special meeting of the Board of Directors called at the request of
the Bank Board. At 10 A.M. a demand was made that all the Directors resign. This was refused,
and at 4 P.M. a Supervisory Representative in Charge took possession.




5 (d) (1) or 5 (d) (2), "in a proper case", and that Beacon had failed to
exhaust its administrative remedies, since it could obtain review of the ap-
pointment of a conservator, should one ,be appointed.3"
The Board then proceeded with the administrative hearing, and a con-
servator was appointed for Beacon. Beacon sought review of that order,
reiterating its contention that the Board had abused its discretion in proceed-
ing under Section 5 (d) (2) and urging that there was no emergency because
Beacon was solvent. On the procedural points, the District Court again held
that the Board's choice of 5 (d)o(2) over 5 (d) (1) was not reviewable as
such, and that any question of emergency or right to appoint a Supervisory
Representative in Charge had merged in the issue then before the Court, the
propriety of the appointment of a conservator. 3
On the latter point, the Court reviewed the evidence and refused to in-
terfere with the appointment of the conservator.
The second case is that of Miami Beach Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v.
Callender." In that case, the Board was of the opinion that the Association
was violating the law and regulations and engaging in unsafe and unsound
practices. Representatives of the Board appeared at a meeting of the Direc-
tors of the Association (called upon demand of the Board) and informed
the Directors that unless some of the Directors (who had been indicted) "
resigned, and unless the number of Directors was increased, the Board would
proceed under Section 5 (d) (2). Some of the Directors resigned, and the
Association's by-laws were changed to increase the directorate. Other Direc-
tors satisfactory to the Board were elected on February 11, 1958.
Suit was brought in the Federal District Court, in the nature of a stock-
holders derivative action, for a declaratory judgment and a temporary and
permanent injunction. The Board was charged with unlawful coercion, and
the Plaintiffs asked that the shareholders be given the opportunity to elect
a new Board of Directors and that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board be
enjoined from its arbitrary and capricious interference.
The Bank Board filed a motion to dismiss. This, and the motion for a
preliminary injunction, were argued on March 7, 1958. By that time, the
Defendants, who included the newly elected directors, had not yet filed an
34 ld. at 536.
85 Beacon Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n. v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 162 F. Supp. 350
(E.D. Wis. 1958). I have been informed that this decision has been appealed to the U. S.
Court of Appeals.
36 256 F. 2d 410 (5th Cir. 1958).
37 See U.S.A. v. Meyer, D.C.S.D. of Florida, Miami Division, No. 10,529 M-Criminal. The
indictments were dismissed on July 3, 1958.
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answer. No testimony was taken by the Court. On March 11, 1958, the
District Judge entered an order, inter alia, that a special meeting of the
shareholders be held to replace the newly elected directors. On March 12,
1958, the Bank Board filed an appeal and obtained a temporary stay.
The appeal was decided in favor of the Board on June 17, 1958. The
Court said: 8
"When a governmental agency holds such great powers over its offspring,
even to the point of appointing a conservator or receiver to replace the manage-
ment, 12 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1464 (d) (2), it is difficult to hold that an informal re-
quest, even demand, to clean house would amount to an abuse of the statutory
powers and discretion of the agency. Construing the vague allegations of the
complaint most favorably to the plaintiffs, at the utmost there was a threat
by the board representative to utilize the statutory and legal procedures and
sanctions, if resignations of the directors under indictment were not tendered.
Realistically, this appears to be the only pressure a representative of the Board
could exert."
In a footnote, the Court pointed out that the Association and the directors
could have refused to comply with the alleged demands, or invoked the for-
mal administrative and judicial machinery to determine whether the Board's
representatives were acting improperly.
The next case discusses the possible remedy open to the Association under
similar circumstances; it involved an action brought by the Greater Dela-
ware Valley Federal Savings and Loan Association to enjoin the appointment
of a Supervisory Representative in Charge." The Association averred that
it was solvent, that there was no emergency, that the Board nonetheless had
threatened to appoint a Supervisory Representative in Charge, and that this
would cause irreparable harm.
In this case, on May 6, 1958, representatives of the Board, without prior
notice, appeared at a meeting of the Association's directors and informally
delivered an ultimatum (1) that all the directors resign immediately, or (2)
that the Association immediately agree to merge with another Federal As-
sociation, or (3) that the Association immediately agree to the appointment
of a conservator. The charges, orally stated, were based generally on an ex-
amination made as of June 26, 1956 (almost two years before) and were to
3 256 F. 2d 410, 414. Litigation and controversy in this case is continuing between those
Directors who are satisfactory to the Bank Board and former Directors and others who contend
they actually represent the shareholder. No Supervisory Representative or Conservator was ap-
pointed because the Bank Board is in practical control, through approved Directors of the Associa-
tion.
3 Greater Delaware Valley Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n. v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd.,
163 F. Supp. 176 (E. D. Pa. 1958).
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the broad effect that the two managing officers had obtained control of the
Association and its operations and had shaped its financial policies with re-
spect to its construction loans so as to receive substantial commissions or fees
in connection with these loans. The Association replied that all its practices
in connection with construction loans had been known to the Board for a
period of twenty years, and that no law or regulation had been violated. The
Association averred, while the Board denied, that the ultimatum was accom-
panied by the threat to appoint a Supervisory Representative in Charge unless
the Association acceded to one of the tri-partite demands.
The District Court found that the threat to appoint a Supervisory Rep-
fesentative in Charge had been made and issued an injunction. The opinion
states that while the Board did have the right to declare an emergency and
to make such an appointment, it did not have the right to issue the coercive
ultimatum and had abused its powers in threatening to make the appoint-
ment unless its terms were complied with. The District Court Judge" stated,
in his opinion, that the Board did not have the power to dictate merger or
resignation terms in the absence of a conservatorship.
In the course of the hearing in the District Court, counsel for the Asso-
ciation asked counsel for the Board to say in open court that the Board would
not appoint a Supervisory Representative in Charge unless the Board first
found that an emergency in fact existed. The record shows that the follow-
ing then occurred:'
(Board Counsel)
Our position is that the Board without notice, without hearing, ex parte,
may appoint a supervisory representative in charge to take immediate charge
of an association when the Board in its opinion believes that grounds exists
for the appointment of a receiver, and when the Board determines that an
emergency exists requiring immediate action.
The statute does not say if an emergency exists they may, it says if the
Board determines that emergency exists it may appoint a supervisory representa-
tive.
(The Court)
Yes, they create the emergency by determining that it exists."
This seems to be a statement by the Board's legal representatives that any
situation is an emergency if the Bank Board chooses to think so. This seems
40 Hon. Thomas C. Egan.
41 Transcript of Proceedings, Greater Delaware Valley Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n. v.
Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., Civil Action No. 24,716 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
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to be an indication that the Board will not use Section 5 (d) (1) but consider
Section 5 (d) (2) as the proper and most effective machinery of enforcement
of its policies.
The Bank Board filed an appeal in the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. This was argued on November 7, 1958. On November 10, 1958
the Association held a special meeting of its shareholders and overwhelm-
ingly adopted the proper resolutions to convert to a state-chartered savings
and loan association, with retention of its Federal insurance of accounts. On
November 12, 1958, the Bank Board having decided to appoint a conserva-
tor, the administrative hearings on the appointment of a conservator com-
menced.
On December 30, 1958, the Court of Appeals filed its opinion 42 sustaining
the position of the Bank Board, reversing the judgment of the District Court,
and directing the dismissal of the complaint. In its opinion the Court of Appeals
stated the question to be whether "it is within the province and authority of a
court to determine whether 'any existing acts and practices' . . . of the local
Association are such as to justify the Board in a contemplated and threatened
exercise of its emergency power of ex parte seizure and temporary management
of the business of the association." The question advanced by the Association
was whether a court may interfere when the Board threatens to use emergency
provisions in a non-emergency situation. It may be noted that the manner of
stating the question in a case often leads to the decision. However that may be,
the Court of Appeals answered the question as stated by it by holding that the
Bank Board has absolute statutory discretion to use the emergency machinery,
and that no court may interfere with its judgment as to the gravity of the situa-
tion and the urgent need for immediate corrective measures. The Court '" said:
"In the nature of the matter involved, it is entirely understandable that
Congress should have viewed the danger of harm to the local enterprise through
any error of judgment or even abuse of discretion by the responsible national
Board in this preliminary procedure as far less than the danger to the enter-
prise, its investors and the public generally, if the Board should not be em-
powered immediately to supersede management whenever in its view an
emergency should so require."
The Association, in the face of the proceedings in the Courts and the pro-
ceedings (not yet concluded) for the appointment of a conservator, pursued
the path toward conversion to a state-chartered savings and loan association
with retention of its Federal insurance of its accounts. On January 2, 1959, the
42 - F. 2d - (1958).
43 Opinion by Hastie, Circuit Judge.
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Pennsylvania Secretary of Banking formally approved the proposed conversion,
and the new state charter was issued by the Pennsylvania Department of State
on January 5, 1959. 44
CONCLUSION
The record of the Bank Board in reported litigation shows, therefore,
uniform success. It is difficult to criticize adversely any of these decisions
because of the apparently plain meaning of the statutory provisions when inter-
preted without regard to the intentions of the legislative proponents and the
understanding and expectations of the savings and loan industry.
That there will be repercussions in the industry seems beyond question.
These savings and loan institutions are usually regarded with jealous pride by
many able founders and managers who have devoted their lives to the growth
and progress of their associations. The feeling is becoming widespread that
Congressional inquiry into the present philosophy of supervision of the Bank
Board is necessary. Litigation and controversy cannot be considered as beneficial
to any banking system. The use of the iron hand, where plain regulation and
direction is all that is required, would seem to be harmful in an area where
balances are always delicate. The fact that one Association, in the face of the
iron hand, has withdrawn from the Federal system is bound to raise revaluations
of both Federal and State supervision with reconsideration of the benefits and
disadvantages of each.
44 The Bank Board has taken the position that because of the reciprocal provisions of the
Pennsylvania Building and Loan Code, this conversion required its approval. Such approval was
not obtained. This raises other interesting questions. On January 21, 1959, Federal Home Loan
Bank Board instituted suit, Civil Action 25844, in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, against Greater Delaware Valley Federal Savings and Loan Association,
praying for a declaratory judgment that its conversion to a State-chartered Association was void
because of failure to obtain the approval of the Bank Board and because this approval is required
under the reciprocal provisions of the Home Owners' Loan Act, since Pennsylvania requires the
approval of its Secretary of Banking for a conversion from State to Federal.
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